The team of epistemology group, led by Tenured Associate Professor Davide Fassio and ZJU 100 Young Professor Jie Gao, has research interests in epistemology and its intersections with other areas, such as ethics, decision theory, philosophy of mind, linguistics and philosophy of AI. Much of their research has been published in top journals, such as Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese.
Our website: http://www.epizju.com/
Davide Fassio is a Associate Professor at the School of Philosophy of Zhejiang University, and Research Associate at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Johannesburg.
Before that, he has been post-doctoral researcher at the University of Geneva and Visiting Scholar at the University of Southampton and King's College London. He earned his PhD in philosophy at the University of Geneva.
He works on issues at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind and theory of rationality. His published works cover a wide range of topics, including the aims and norms of belief, epistemic norms of action and assertion, the relation between knowledge and practical rationality, shifty epistemology, epistemic paradoxes (in particular, the Knowability Paradox), the role of the epistemic perspective in moral evaluation, knowledge-based decision theory, the nature of risk and danger.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/davidefassio
I mainly work in the area of epistemo
-logy and ethics. I try to understand
belief, love and emotion within a
unified freamwork. When not doing
philosophy, I spend most of my time
reading novels, playing video game
and staying with my family.
Davide Fassio, “Croyance”. L’Encyclopédie Philosophique. https://encyclo-philo.fr/page/apropos. ISSN 2606-6661,
Davide Fassio, “What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought”. Philosophical Studies, 2022, 179: 1523–1544.
Guowei LAI, “The Debate between Objectivism and Perspectivism: Objections to Lord’s Arguments” Foreign Philosophy. 2022 (CSSCI)
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Sensitivism: Threshold vs. Credence-one’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Davide Fassio, Jie GAO, “Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?”, Synthese, 2021, 199: 7031–7059.
Davide Fassio, “In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism”. In C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. 2021, New York: Routledge Series in Epistemology.
Davide Fassio, “Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration”, Ethics, 2021, 131(2): 183–206.
Guowei Lai,“The Debate between Evidentialism and Pragmatism: Rinard’s Objection to Kelly’s and Shah’s Arguments Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 2021, 37 (8): 10-15.
Jie GAO, ‘Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Dilemma for Epistemic Rationality’, Ratio, 2021, 34(1): 20-32.
Davide Fassio, “Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief”, Dialogue, 2020, 59(3): 497-525.
Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence, Theoria, 2020, 86(4): 500-527.
Davide Fassio, “Moderate Skeptical Invariantism”, Erkenntnis, 2020, 85: 841-870.
Davide Fassio, “On the Generality Argument for the Knowledge Norm”, Synthese, 2020, 197(8): 34593480.
Davide Fassio, “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l’œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.), , 2020,PUAM.
Davide Fassio, “Sur la correction doxastique comme ideal de la raison”, Klesis - La philosophie de Pascal Engel (ed. J. H. Vollet). 2020, 45: 1-20.
Jie GAO, ‘Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle’ (默认假定，枢轴承诺与闭合原则), Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯), 2020, 42 (5): 17-22. (CSSCI)
Davide Fassio, “Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?”, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (12): 3253-3283.
Davide Fassio, “On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have”, Ratio, 2019, 32 (1), 63-73.
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Pragmatism’, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (6): 1595-1617.
Jie GAO, ‘Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases’, Episteme, 2019, 16 (1): 92-107.
Davide Fassio, “Passing the Epistemic Buck” (with A. Meylan), in McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.) Metaepistemology, 2018, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 25 (4), 1084-1106.
Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?”, Philosophical Studies, 2017, 174 (9), 2137-2166.
Davide Fassio, Introduction to the Synthese Special issue Truth and Epistemic Norms (with J. Dutant and A. Meylan), Synthese, 2017, 194 (5), 1427–1431.
Jie GAO, ‘Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa)’, Synthese, 2017, 194 (6): 1901-1917.
Jie GAO, ‘Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?’ (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, 2017, New York, Routledge, 81-93.
Davide Fassio, “A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism”, Philosophical Papers, 2016, 45 (3), 343-364.
Davide Fassio, “Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards” in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, 2016, DeGruyter. Pages 165-184.
Davide Fassio, “Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance”, in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016, Collège de France, Paris (invited).
Davide Fassio, “The Aim of Belief”. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
Davide Fassio, “Revisionary Epistemology” (with R. McKenna), in Inquiry, 2015, 58 (7-8), 755-779. Special issue Philosophical Methodology and Metaphilosophy. Ed. Herman Cappelen.
Davide Fassio, “Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right”, Logos & Episteme, 2015, 6 (3): 265289.
Davide Fassio, “A Blind-spot Argument against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief”, Acta Analytica, 2014, 29 (1): 71-81.
Davide Fassio, “Truth and the Aim of Belief”, in Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard, 2014, New York: Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Il fine della credenza”, Aphex, 9. 2014.
Davide Fassio, “Taking Norm-Regulation Seriously”, in Dutant, J., Fassio D. and Meylan A. (eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, 2014, University of Geneva, pp. 760-777.
Davide Fassio, “Il Paradosso della Conoscibilità”, Aphex, 7. 2013.
Davide Fassio, “How to Distinguish Norms from Values”, in The Place of Values in a World of Norms, 5th Issue of Phenomenology and Mind, pp. 148-158. Ed, 2013, Francesca Forlè and Sarah SonghorianPavia: IUSS Press.
Davide Fassio, “Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in Theoria, 2011, Vol. 77 (2), pp. 180-193.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Normativity”, in Logique et Analyse, 2011, 54 (216): 471-486.
Davide Fassio, “Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in M. D’Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, 2010, London: College Publications.
Davide Fassio, “Logically Unknowable Propositions: a criticism to Tennant’s three-partition of Anti-Cartesian propositions” (with M. Carrara), in P. Hanna (ed.) An Anthology of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 2. Atiner 2009: 181-194.
The team of epistemology group, led by Tenured Associate Professor Davide Fassio and ZJU 100 Young Professor Jie Gao, has research interests in epistemology and its intersections with other areas, such as ethics, decision theory, philosophy of mind, linguistics and philosophy of AI. Much of their research has been published in top journals, such as Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese.
Our website: http://www.epizju.com/
Davide Fassio is a Associate Professor at the School of Philosophy of Zhejiang University, and Research Associate at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Johannesburg.
Before that, he has been post-doctoral researcher at the University of Geneva and Visiting Scholar at the University of Southampton and King's College London. He earned his PhD in philosophy at the University of Geneva.
He works on issues at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind and theory of rationality. His published works cover a wide range of topics, including the aims and norms of belief, epistemic norms of action and assertion, the relation between knowledge and practical rationality, shifty epistemology, epistemic paradoxes (in particular, the Knowability Paradox), the role of the epistemic perspective in moral evaluation, knowledge-based decision theory, the nature of risk and danger.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/davidefassio
Jie Gao obtained her PhD in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh in 2016. Since 2018, she have been a researcher (ZJU 100 Young Professor in Humanities and Social Science) at the School of Philosophy at Zhejiang University. She is also a co-founder of the Asian Epistemology Network and an associate editor of the Asian Journal of Philosophy.
Her research mainly concerns connections between epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Her current research project is about the sensitivity of doxastic attitudes (in particular belief and credence) to practical considerations (such as stakes and urgency). She is also interested in the following topics: pragmatic encroachment, the belief-credence relation, cross-linguistic studies of philosophical concepts and decision theory.
She is currently teaching courses on the following topics: academic reading and writing in philosophy; epistemology; formal tools in analytical philosophy.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/jiegao
I mainly work in the area of epistemo
-logy and ethics. I try to understand
belief, love and emotion within a
unified freamwork. When not doing
philosophy, I spend most of my time
reading novels, playing video game
and staying with my family.
I am a doctoral student at school of
philosophy in Zhejiang University.
I mainly focus on epistemology and
ethics, especially topics about epistemic
luck, epistemic risk, moral luck and the
analysis of knowledge.
I'm a doctoral student at the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
obtained my master's degree at Zhejiang
University in June 2022. I work mainly
on the issue of epistemology, particularly
the epistemic norm of action and the
relation between belief and certainty.
I’m a doctoral student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. My
research interests mainly focus on legal
epistemology, especially the area of
statistical evidence. I’m fond of singing
and swimming.
Working primarily in epistemology
and the philosophy of mind, I try to
understand whether and to what extent
our ordinary cognition judgments rely
on perceptual experience as opposed
to back-ground beliefs.
I am a master student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
am interested in epistemology and the
history of analytic philosophy.
I am a master student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
mainly work in the area of epistemology,
particularly the cross-linguistic studies of
philosophical concepts and moral encroachment.
A master student from the School of
Philosophy, Zhejiang University. I'm
Interested in numerous philosophical
directions, mainly focusing on episte-
-mology, cognitive philosophy, and
emotional philosophy.
Davide Fassio, “Croyance”. L’Encyclopédie Philosophique. https://encyclo-philo.fr/page/apropos. ISSN 2606-6661,
Davide Fassio, “What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought”. Philosophical Studies, 2022, 179: 1523–1544.
Guowei LAI, “The Debate between Objectivism and Perspectivism: Objections to Lord’s Arguments” Foreign Philosophy. 2022 (CSSCI)
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Sensitivism: Threshold vs. Credence-one’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Davide Fassio, Jie GAO, “Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?”, Synthese, 2021, 199: 7031–7059.
Davide Fassio, “In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism”. In C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. 2021, New York: Routledge Series in Epistemology.
Davide Fassio, “Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration”, Ethics, 2021, 131(2): 183–206.
Guowei Lai,“The Debate between Evidentialism and Pragmatism: Rinard’s Objection to Kelly’s and Shah’s Arguments Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 2021, 37 (8): 10-15.
Jie GAO, ‘Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Dilemma for Epistemic Rationality’, Ratio, 2021, 34(1): 20-32.
Davide Fassio, “Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief”, Dialogue, 2020, 59(3): 497-525.
Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence, Theoria, 2020, 86(4): 500-527.
Davide Fassio, “Moderate Skeptical Invariantism”, Erkenntnis, 2020, 85: 841-870.
Davide Fassio, “On the Generality Argument for the Knowledge Norm”, Synthese, 2020, 197(8): 34593480.
Davide Fassio, “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l’œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.), , 2020,PUAM.
Davide Fassio, “Sur la correction doxastique comme ideal de la raison”, Klesis - La philosophie de Pascal Engel (ed. J. H. Vollet). 2020, 45: 1-20.
Jie GAO, ‘Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle’ (默认假定，枢轴承诺与闭合原则), Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯), 2020, 42 (5): 17-22. (CSSCI)
Davide Fassio, “Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?”, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (12): 3253-3283.
Davide Fassio, “On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have”, Ratio, 2019, 32 (1), 63-73.
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Pragmatism’, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (6): 1595-1617.
Jie GAO, ‘Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases’, Episteme, 2019, 16 (1): 92-107.
Davide Fassio, “Passing the Epistemic Buck” (with A. Meylan), in McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.) Metaepistemology, 2018, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 25 (4), 1084-1106.
Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?”, Philosophical Studies, 2017, 174 (9), 2137-2166.
Davide Fassio, Introduction to the Synthese Special issue Truth and Epistemic Norms (with J. Dutant and A. Meylan), Synthese, 2017, 194 (5), 1427–1431.
Jie GAO, ‘Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa)’, Synthese, 2017, 194 (6): 1901-1917.
Jie GAO, ‘Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?’ (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, 2017, New York, Routledge, 81-93.
Davide Fassio, “A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism”, Philosophical Papers, 2016, 45 (3), 343-364.
Davide Fassio, “Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards” in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, 2016, DeGruyter. Pages 165-184.
Davide Fassio, “Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance”, in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016, Collège de France, Paris (invited).
Davide Fassio, “The Aim of Belief”. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
Davide Fassio, “Revisionary Epistemology” (with R. McKenna), in Inquiry, 2015, 58 (7-8), 755-779. Special issue Philosophical Methodology and Metaphilosophy. Ed. Herman Cappelen.
Davide Fassio, “Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right”, Logos & Episteme, 2015, 6 (3): 265289.
Davide Fassio, “A Blind-spot Argument against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief”, Acta Analytica, 2014, 29 (1): 71-81.
Davide Fassio, “Truth and the Aim of Belief”, in Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard, 2014, New York: Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Il fine della credenza”, Aphex, 9. 2014.
Davide Fassio, “Taking Norm-Regulation Seriously”, in Dutant, J., Fassio D. and Meylan A. (eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, 2014, University of Geneva, pp. 760-777.
Davide Fassio, “Il Paradosso della Conoscibilità”, Aphex, 7. 2013.
Davide Fassio, “How to Distinguish Norms from Values”, in The Place of Values in a World of Norms, 5th Issue of Phenomenology and Mind, pp. 148-158. Ed, 2013, Francesca Forlè and Sarah SonghorianPavia: IUSS Press.
Davide Fassio, “Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in Theoria, 2011, Vol. 77 (2), pp. 180-193.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Normativity”, in Logique et Analyse, 2011, 54 (216): 471-486.
Davide Fassio, “Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in M. D’Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, 2010, London: College Publications.
Davide Fassio, “Logically Unknowable Propositions: a criticism to Tennant’s three-partition of Anti-Cartesian propositions” (with M. Carrara), in P. Hanna (ed.) An Anthology of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 2. Atiner 2009: 181-194.
The team of epistemology group, led by Tenured Associate Professor Davide Fassio and ZJU 100 Young Professor Jie Gao, has research interests in epistemology and its intersections with other areas, such as ethics, decision theory, philosophy of mind, linguistics and philosophy of AI. Much of their research has been published in top journals, such as Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese.
Our website: http://www.epizju.com/
Davide Fassio is a Associate Professor at the School of Philosophy of Zhejiang University, and Research Associate at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Johannesburg.
Before that, he has been post-doctoral researcher at the University of Geneva and Visiting Scholar at the University of Southampton and King's College London. He earned his PhD in philosophy at the University of Geneva.
He works on issues at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind and theory of rationality. His published works cover a wide range of topics, including the aims and norms of belief, epistemic norms of action and assertion, the relation between knowledge and practical rationality, shifty epistemology, epistemic paradoxes (in particular, the Knowability Paradox), the role of the epistemic perspective in moral evaluation, knowledge-based decision theory, the nature of risk and danger.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/davidefassio
Jie Gao obtained her PhD in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh in 2016. Since 2018, she have been a researcher (ZJU 100 Young Professor in Humanities and Social Science) at the School of Philosophy at Zhejiang University. She is also a co-founder of the Asian Epistemology Network and an associate editor of the Asian Journal of Philosophy.
Her research mainly concerns connections between epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Her current research project is about the sensitivity of doxastic attitudes (in particular belief and credence) to practical considerations (such as stakes and urgency). She is also interested in the following topics: pragmatic encroachment, the belief-credence relation, cross-linguistic studies of philosophical concepts and decision theory.
She is currently teaching courses on the following topics: academic reading and writing in philosophy; epistemology; formal tools in analytical philosophy.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/jiegao
I mainly work in the area of epistemo
-logy and ethics. I try to understand
belief, love and emotion within a
unified freamwork. When not doing
philosophy, I spend most of my time
reading novels, playing video game
and staying with my family.
I am a doctoral student at school of
philosophy in Zhejiang University.
I mainly focus on epistemology and
ethics, especially topics about epistemic
luck, epistemic risk, moral luck and the
analysis of knowledge.
I'm a doctoral student at the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
obtained my master's degree at Zhejiang
University in June 2022. I work mainly
on the issue of epistemology, particularly
the epistemic norm of action and the
relation between belief and certainty.
I’m a doctoral student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. My
research interests mainly focus on legal
epistemology, especially the area of
statistical evidence. I’m fond of singing
and swimming.
Working primarily in epistemology
and the philosophy of mind, I try to
understand whether and to what extent
our ordinary cognition judgments rely
on perceptual experience as opposed
to back-ground beliefs.
I am a master student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
am interested in epistemology and the
history of analytic philosophy.
I am a master student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
mainly work in the area of epistemology,
particularly the cross-linguistic studies of
philosophical concepts and moral encroachment.
A master student from the School of
Philosophy, Zhejiang University. I'm
Interested in numerous philosophical
directions, mainly focusing on episte-
-mology, cognitive philosophy, and
emotional philosophy.
Davide Fassio, “Croyance”. L’Encyclopédie Philosophique. https://encyclo-philo.fr/page/apropos. ISSN 2606-6661,
Davide Fassio, “What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought”. Philosophical Studies, 2022, 179: 1523–1544.
Guowei LAI, “The Debate between Objectivism and Perspectivism: Objections to Lord’s Arguments” Foreign Philosophy. 2022 (CSSCI)
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Sensitivism: Threshold vs. Credence-one’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Davide Fassio, Jie GAO, “Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?”, Synthese, 2021, 199: 7031–7059.
Davide Fassio, “In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism”. In C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. 2021, New York: Routledge Series in Epistemology.
Davide Fassio, “Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration”, Ethics, 2021, 131(2): 183–206.
Guowei Lai,“The Debate between Evidentialism and Pragmatism: Rinard’s Objection to Kelly’s and Shah’s Arguments Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 2021, 37 (8): 10-15.
Jie GAO, ‘Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Dilemma for Epistemic Rationality’, Ratio, 2021, 34(1): 20-32.
Davide Fassio, “Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief”, Dialogue, 2020, 59(3): 497-525.
Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence, Theoria, 2020, 86(4): 500-527.
Davide Fassio, “Moderate Skeptical Invariantism”, Erkenntnis, 2020, 85: 841-870.
Davide Fassio, “On the Generality Argument for the Knowledge Norm”, Synthese, 2020, 197(8): 34593480.
Davide Fassio, “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l’œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.), , 2020,PUAM.
Davide Fassio, “Sur la correction doxastique comme ideal de la raison”, Klesis - La philosophie de Pascal Engel (ed. J. H. Vollet). 2020, 45: 1-20.
Jie GAO, ‘Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle’ (默认假定，枢轴承诺与闭合原则), Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯), 2020, 42 (5): 17-22. (CSSCI)
Davide Fassio, “Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?”, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (12): 3253-3283.
Davide Fassio, “On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have”, Ratio, 2019, 32 (1), 63-73.
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Pragmatism’, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (6): 1595-1617.
Jie GAO, ‘Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases’, Episteme, 2019, 16 (1): 92-107.
Davide Fassio, “Passing the Epistemic Buck” (with A. Meylan), in McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.) Metaepistemology, 2018, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 25 (4), 1084-1106.
Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?”, Philosophical Studies, 2017, 174 (9), 2137-2166.
Davide Fassio, Introduction to the Synthese Special issue Truth and Epistemic Norms (with J. Dutant and A. Meylan), Synthese, 2017, 194 (5), 1427–1431.
Jie GAO, ‘Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa)’, Synthese, 2017, 194 (6): 1901-1917.
Jie GAO, ‘Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?’ (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, 2017, New York, Routledge, 81-93.
Davide Fassio, “A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism”, Philosophical Papers, 2016, 45 (3), 343-364.
Davide Fassio, “Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards” in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, 2016, DeGruyter. Pages 165-184.
Davide Fassio, “Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance”, in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016, Collège de France, Paris (invited).
Davide Fassio, “The Aim of Belief”. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
Davide Fassio, “Revisionary Epistemology” (with R. McKenna), in Inquiry, 2015, 58 (7-8), 755-779. Special issue Philosophical Methodology and Metaphilosophy. Ed. Herman Cappelen.
Davide Fassio, “Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right”, Logos & Episteme, 2015, 6 (3): 265289.
Davide Fassio, “A Blind-spot Argument against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief”, Acta Analytica, 2014, 29 (1): 71-81.
Davide Fassio, “Truth and the Aim of Belief”, in Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard, 2014, New York: Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Il fine della credenza”, Aphex, 9. 2014.
Davide Fassio, “Taking Norm-Regulation Seriously”, in Dutant, J., Fassio D. and Meylan A. (eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, 2014, University of Geneva, pp. 760-777.
Davide Fassio, “Il Paradosso della Conoscibilità”, Aphex, 7. 2013.
Davide Fassio, “How to Distinguish Norms from Values”, in The Place of Values in a World of Norms, 5th Issue of Phenomenology and Mind, pp. 148-158. Ed, 2013, Francesca Forlè and Sarah SonghorianPavia: IUSS Press.
Davide Fassio, “Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in Theoria, 2011, Vol. 77 (2), pp. 180-193.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Normativity”, in Logique et Analyse, 2011, 54 (216): 471-486.
Davide Fassio, “Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in M. D’Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, 2010, London: College Publications.
Davide Fassio, “Logically Unknowable Propositions: a criticism to Tennant’s three-partition of Anti-Cartesian propositions” (with M. Carrara), in P. Hanna (ed.) An Anthology of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 2. Atiner 2009: 181-194.
The team of epistemology group, led by Tenured Associate Professor Davide Fassio and ZJU 100 Young Professor Jie Gao, has research interests in epistemology and its intersections with other areas, such as ethics, decision theory, philosophy of mind, linguistics and philosophy of AI. Much of their research has been published in top journals, such as Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese.
Our website: http://www.epizju.com/
Davide Fassio is a Associate Professor at the School of Philosophy of Zhejiang University, and Research Associate at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Johannesburg.
Before that, he has been post-doctoral researcher at the University of Geneva and Visiting Scholar at the University of Southampton and King's College London. He earned his PhD in philosophy at the University of Geneva.
He works on issues at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind and theory of rationality. His published works cover a wide range of topics, including the aims and norms of belief, epistemic norms of action and assertion, the relation between knowledge and practical rationality, shifty epistemology, epistemic paradoxes (in particular, the Knowability Paradox), the role of the epistemic perspective in moral evaluation, knowledge-based decision theory, the nature of risk and danger.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/davidefassio
Jie Gao obtained her PhD in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh in 2016. Since 2018, she have been a researcher (ZJU 100 Young Professor in Humanities and Social Science) at the School of Philosophy at Zhejiang University. She is also a co-founder of the Asian Epistemology Network and an associate editor of the Asian Journal of Philosophy.
Her research mainly concerns connections between epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Her current research project is about the sensitivity of doxastic attitudes (in particular belief and credence) to practical considerations (such as stakes and urgency). She is also interested in the following topics: pragmatic encroachment, the belief-credence relation, cross-linguistic studies of philosophical concepts and decision theory.
She is currently teaching courses on the following topics: academic reading and writing in philosophy; epistemology; formal tools in analytical philosophy.
Personal Website: https://person.zju.edu.cn/en/jiegao
I mainly work in the area of epistemo
-logy and ethics. I try to understand
belief, love and emotion within a
unified freamwork. When not doing
philosophy, I spend most of my time
reading novels, playing video game
and staying with my family.
I am a doctoral student at school of
philosophy in Zhejiang University.
I mainly focus on epistemology and
ethics, especially topics about epistemic
luck, epistemic risk, moral luck and the
analysis of knowledge.
I'm a doctoral student at the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
obtained my master's degree at Zhejiang
University in June 2022. I work mainly
on the issue of epistemology, particularly
the epistemic norm of action and the
relation between belief and certainty.
I’m a doctoral student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. My
research interests mainly focus on legal
epistemology, especially the area of
statistical evidence. I’m fond of singing
and swimming.
Working primarily in epistemology
and the philosophy of mind, I try to
understand whether and to what extent
our ordinary cognition judgments rely
on perceptual experience as opposed
to back-ground beliefs.
I am a master student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
am interested in epistemology and the
history of analytic philosophy.
I am a master student in the School of
Philosophy at Zhejiang University. I
mainly work in the area of epistemology,
particularly the cross-linguistic studies of
philosophical concepts and moral encroachment.
A master student from the School of
Philosophy, Zhejiang University. I'm
Interested in numerous philosophical
directions, mainly focusing on episte-
-mology, cognitive philosophy, and
emotional philosophy.
Davide Fassio, “Croyance”. L’Encyclopédie Philosophique. https://encyclo-philo.fr/page/apropos. ISSN 2606-6661,
Davide Fassio, “What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought”. Philosophical Studies, 2022, 179: 1523–1544.
Guowei LAI, “The Debate between Objectivism and Perspectivism: Objections to Lord’s Arguments” Foreign Philosophy. 2022 (CSSCI)
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Sensitivism: Threshold vs. Credence-one’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Davide Fassio, Jie GAO, “Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?”, Synthese, 2021, 199: 7031–7059.
Davide Fassio, “In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism”. In C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. 2021, New York: Routledge Series in Epistemology.
Davide Fassio, “Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration”, Ethics, 2021, 131(2): 183–206.
Guowei Lai,“The Debate between Evidentialism and Pragmatism: Rinard’s Objection to Kelly’s and Shah’s Arguments Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 2021, 37 (8): 10-15.
Jie GAO, ‘Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Dilemma for Epistemic Rationality’, Ratio, 2021, 34(1): 20-32.
Davide Fassio, “Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief”, Dialogue, 2020, 59(3): 497-525.
Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence, Theoria, 2020, 86(4): 500-527.
Davide Fassio, “Moderate Skeptical Invariantism”, Erkenntnis, 2020, 85: 841-870.
Davide Fassio, “On the Generality Argument for the Knowledge Norm”, Synthese, 2020, 197(8): 34593480.
Davide Fassio, “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l’œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.), , 2020,PUAM.
Davide Fassio, “Sur la correction doxastique comme ideal de la raison”, Klesis - La philosophie de Pascal Engel (ed. J. H. Vollet). 2020, 45: 1-20.
Jie GAO, ‘Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle’ (默认假定，枢轴承诺与闭合原则), Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯), 2020, 42 (5): 17-22. (CSSCI)
Davide Fassio, “Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?”, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (12): 3253-3283.
Davide Fassio, “On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have”, Ratio, 2019, 32 (1), 63-73.
Jie GAO, ‘Credal Pragmatism’, Philosophical Studies, 2019, 176 (6): 1595-1617.
Jie GAO, ‘Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases’, Episteme, 2019, 16 (1): 92-107.
Davide Fassio, “Passing the Epistemic Buck” (with A. Meylan), in McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.) Metaepistemology, 2018, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 25 (4), 1084-1106.
Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?”, Philosophical Studies, 2017, 174 (9), 2137-2166.
Davide Fassio, Introduction to the Synthese Special issue Truth and Epistemic Norms (with J. Dutant and A. Meylan), Synthese, 2017, 194 (5), 1427–1431.
Jie GAO, ‘Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa)’, Synthese, 2017, 194 (6): 1901-1917.
Jie GAO, ‘Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?’ (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, 2017, New York, Routledge, 81-93.
Davide Fassio, “A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism”, Philosophical Papers, 2016, 45 (3), 343-364.
Davide Fassio, “Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards” in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, 2016, DeGruyter. Pages 165-184.
Davide Fassio, “Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance”, in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016, Collège de France, Paris (invited).
Davide Fassio, “The Aim of Belief”. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
Davide Fassio, “Revisionary Epistemology” (with R. McKenna), in Inquiry, 2015, 58 (7-8), 755-779. Special issue Philosophical Methodology and Metaphilosophy. Ed. Herman Cappelen.
Davide Fassio, “Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right”, Logos & Episteme, 2015, 6 (3): 265289.
Davide Fassio, “A Blind-spot Argument against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief”, Acta Analytica, 2014, 29 (1): 71-81.
Davide Fassio, “Truth and the Aim of Belief”, in Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard, 2014, New York: Oxford University Press.
Davide Fassio, “Il fine della credenza”, Aphex, 9. 2014.
Davide Fassio, “Taking Norm-Regulation Seriously”, in Dutant, J., Fassio D. and Meylan A. (eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, 2014, University of Geneva, pp. 760-777.
Davide Fassio, “Il Paradosso della Conoscibilità”, Aphex, 7. 2013.
Davide Fassio, “How to Distinguish Norms from Values”, in The Place of Values in a World of Norms, 5th Issue of Phenomenology and Mind, pp. 148-158. Ed, 2013, Francesca Forlè and Sarah SonghorianPavia: IUSS Press.
Davide Fassio, “Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in Theoria, 2011, Vol. 77 (2), pp. 180-193.
Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Normativity”, in Logique et Analyse, 2011, 54 (216): 471-486.
Davide Fassio, “Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in M. D’Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, 2010, London: College Publications.
Davide Fassio, “Logically Unknowable Propositions: a criticism to Tennant’s three-partition of Anti-Cartesian propositions” (with M. Carrara), in P. Hanna (ed.) An Anthology of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 2. Atiner 2009: 181-194.
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